Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization by Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









The authors thank seminar participants at the Bank of Portugal, Belgium National Bank, Brown University,
the FRB of San Francisco Conference on "Monetary Policy, Transparency, and Credibility", FRB
of New York, the FRB of St Louis, ECARES Universite Libre de Bruxelles and the 2007 Spring Meeting
of the NBER Monetary Economics Group, and particularly Alejandro Justiniano and our discussants
Michael Ehrmann, Athanasios Orphanides and Chris Sims for detailed comments and discussions.
The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of views
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of
Economic Research. The usual caveat applies.
© 2007 by Stefano Eusepi and Bruce Preston. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization
Stefano Eusepi and Bruce Preston




This paper analyzes the value of communication in the implementation of monetary policy. The central
bank is uncertain about the current state of the economy. Households and firms are uncertain about
the statistical properties of aggregate variables, including nominal interest rates, and must learn about
their dynamics using historical data. Given these uncertainties, when the central bank implements
optimal policy, the Taylor principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability: for reasonable parameterizations
self-fulfilling expectations are possible. To mitigate this instability, three communication strategies
are contemplated: i) communicating the precise details of the monetary policy -- that is, the variables
and coefficients; ii) communicating only the variables on which monetary policy decisions are conditioned;
and iii) communicating the inflation target. The first two strategies restore the Taylor principle as a
sufficient condition for stabilizing expectations. In contrast, in economies with persistent shocks, communicating
the inflation target fails to protect against expectations driven fluctuations. These results underscore
the importance of communicating the systematic component of monetary policy strategy: announcing
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these perceptions [about monetary policy] in any underlying reality – thereby
opening the door to expectational bubbles that can make the eﬀects of its policies
hard to predict. (Blinder, 1999)
1 Introduction
Since the 1990’s, central banking practice has shifted from secrecy and opaqueness towards
greater transparency about monetary policy strategy and objectives. At the same time,
an increasing number of central banks have adopted an inﬂation targeting framework for
monetary policy. One potential beneﬁt from a successful implementation of inﬂation targeting
is the anchoring of expectations, with its stabilizing eﬀect on macroeconomic activity. Failing
to anchor expectations might result in undesired ﬂuctuations and economic instability.
Given the role of expectations, a central bank’s communication strategy is a crucial ingre-
dient of inﬂation targeting. Yet despite its importance, relatively little formal analysis in the
context of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models has been done on the mechanisms
by which communication might prove beneﬁcial. The analysis here addresses this hiatus.
Using a simple model of output gap and inﬂation determination – of the kind used in many
recent analyses of monetary policy – a number of communication strategies are considered
which vary the kinds of information the central bank communicates about its monetary policy
deliberations.
Motivated by Friedman (1947, 1968), a model is developed in which monetary policy stabi-
lization is conducted in the presence of two informational frictions. First, the central bank has
imperfect information about the current state of the economy and must forecast the current
inﬂation rate and output gap when setting the nominal interest rate in any period. Because
of this observation lag the central bank responds to information and the state of the economy
with a delay: policy is implementable in the sense of McCallum (1999) and Orphanides (2003).
Second, households and ﬁrms have an incomplete model of the macroeconomy, knowing only
their own objectives, constraints and beliefs. Consequently, they do not have a model of how
aggregate state variables, including nominal interest rates, are determined. They forecast
1exogenous variables relevant to their decision problems by extrapolating from historical pat-
terns in observed data. Such beliefs capture uncertainty about the future path of nominal
interest rates that is not present in a rational expectations analysis of the model and cre-
ates a delay in the transmission of monetary policy: because beliefs take time to adjust to
new information, policy changes aﬀect the macroeconomy only gradually. Under these as-
sumptions, expectations may become unanchored and need not be consistent with the central
bank’s monetary policy strategy, with adverse consequences for economic stability. These two
frictions combined present a challenge for stabilization policy and permit examination of the
role of communication in policy design.1
Communication is modeled as providing agents with certain types of information about
how the central bank determines its nominal interest rate setting. This information serves to
simplify agents’ forecasting problem and to coordinate expectations about various macroeco-
nomic variables in a desirable way. Worth underscoring is that uncertainty about the path of
nominal interest rates is only one of several sources of uncertainty present in this economy. In-
deed, households and ﬁrms are similarly unsure about how aggregate output and inﬂation are
determined. The central question is whether uncertainty about the determination of interest
rates is an especially important source of uncertainty and whether additional knowledge about
the future path of nominal interest rates helps anchor expectations, assisting macroeconomic
stabilization.2
Three communication strategies are considered. In the benchmark strategy the central
bank discloses, under full credibility, the policy rule employed to set nominal interest rates.
Agents therefore know which variables appear in the policy rule and the precise restriction
that holds among these endogenous variables at all points in time in the forecast horizon.
An alternative interpretation of this communication strategy is that the bank discloses its
forecasts of the entire future path of its policy instrument. A consequence of knowing the
1These frictions also formed the basis of Friedman’s (1968) critique of nominal interest rate rules as a
means to implement monetary policy. The analysis here evaluates the verity of this claim, building on the
seminal analysis of Howitt (1992), and explores the value of communication in macroeconomic stabilization
policy.
2On a technical level, the analysis is concerned with the question of whether communication assists con-
vergence to the underlying rational expectations equilibrium of the model.
2policy rule is that agents need not independently forecast the path of nominal interest rates
–i ti ss u ﬃcient to forecast the set of variables upon which nominal interest rates depend.
Because this relation is one of the many equilibrium restrictions agents are attempting to
learn, by imposing this restriction on their regression model, a more eﬃcient forecast obtains.
The second communication strategy makes available less information. Rather than con-
veying the precise policy rule, the central bank only announces the set of variables upon
which nominal interest rates are conditioned. This strategy might reﬂect partial central bank
credibility or the inability to accurately communicate the complexities of the decision making
process: market participants use available data and the information about the policy rule to
verify the reaction function used to set the nominal interest rate – see Mishkin (2004).
Finally, motivated by the inﬂation targeting literature, which emphasizes the potential
beneﬁts of announcing an inﬂation target for anchoring inﬂation expectations, we explore the
advantages of only communicating the central bank’s desired average outcomes for inﬂation,
nominal interest rates and the output gap. Here the only information that is communicated
is the central bank’s commitment to conduct policy in such a way as to achieve the target
for inﬂation on average. No information on how the central bank will achieve this objective
is given.
The central results are as follows. First, in the case of no communication, policy rules
that implement optimal policy under rational expectations frequently lead to self-fulﬁlling
expectations. An aggressive response to inﬂation expectations – as adherence to the Taylor
principle prescribes – does not guarantee stability. On the contrary, it is likely to further
destabilize expectations. Importantly the Taylor principle is not suﬃcient for stability under
learning dynamics in contrast to a rational expectations analysis of the model.
Second, communicating the entire policy decision process – that is, the relevant con-
ditioning variables and policy coeﬃcients – mitigates instability and allows successful im-
plementation of optimal policy by stabilizing expectations. Hence, communicating accurate
information about the systematic component of current and future monetary policy decisions
anchors expectations and promotes macroeconomic stability. Since our approach to model-
ing household and ﬁrm beliefs represents a small departure from the rational expectations
3assumption – indeed this assumption is nested as a special limiting case – this result under-
scores the value of communication. These stabilization beneﬁts can also be fully captured by a
communication strategy that only conveys the set of endogenous variables on which monetary
policy decisions are conditioned, as proposed by the second communication strategy. This
information, combined with knowledge that nominal interest rates are a linear function of
these objects, delivers convergence to rational expectations equilibrium and protects against
expectations driven instability.
Furthermore we show the importance of incomplete information for the role of commu-
nication. We demonstrate that if the central bank has perfect information about the state
of the economy, then communication is not required for expectations stabilization. Indeed,
policy conditioned on the current inﬂation rate and output gap restores the Taylor princi-
ple. Because the central bank promptly responds to contemporaneous developments in the
economy, large departures of expectations from equilibrium values are prevented. Thus it is
the interaction of the two frictions that leads to instability. However, in practice the current
state will never be accurately observed, making transparency and communication of monetary
policy desirable.
An implication of these results is that it is precisely when the central bank is uncertain
about the state that communication is eﬀective. That is, when the central bank faces a
diﬃcult prediction problem regarding the state of the economy, the beneﬁts of communication
are high. By announcing the monetary policy strategy, the central bank can better control
the economy even though the near term evolution of the economy is highly uncertain.
Third, communication strategies that only announce an inﬂation target and the associated
average long-run values of the nominal interest rate and output gap frequently lead to expecta-
tions driven instability. In an economy with persistent shocks, the conditions for convergence
are identical to those for the benchmark no communication case where these quantities must
be learned. Hence, in such economies, communicating the inﬂation target does little to help
anchor expectations.
It is clear then that communication helps by providing information about the systematic
component of policy and importantly by giving information on how the central bank intends to
4achieve its announced objectives. Credibility about the future conduct of policy matters not
only because of the stabilization bias that emerges from a rational expectations equilibrium
analysis, as is well known from Kydland and Prescott (1977), but also because it helps protect
against departures from rational expectations equilibrium that arise from small expectational
errors on the part of households and ﬁrms.
Related literature: The analysis builds on an earlier literature commencing with Cukier-
man and Meltzer (1986) and more recently Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002). These papers
consider models in which the central bank has an idiosyncratic employment target which is
imperfectly observed by the public. Fluctuations in this target lead to central bank tempta-
tion to deviate from pre-announced inﬂation goals. In this framework, transparency entails
costs and beneﬁts. In Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Faust and Svensson (2002), when a
central bank has a low average inﬂation bias, lack of transparency helps surprise the public,
making monetary policy more eﬀective in stabilizing output ﬂuctuations. The central bank
fully understands the private sector’s expectations formation mechanism and can exploit it
to stabilize output. However, if the central bank has an high inﬂation bias, increased trans-
parency allows the private sector to observe the employment target with greater precision
and therefore raises the costs to the central bank of deviating from its announced objectives.
Transparency is therefore desirable as it provides a commitment mechanism.3
This literature assumes rational expectations on the part of the central bank and the
public. Here we assume that the central bank does not have complete information on private
sector expectations formation and therefore cannot manipulate agents’ beliefs to its own
advantage. We therefore exclude strategic interaction between the central bank and the
private sector. Furthermore, in our model, agents have incomplete information about the
policy reaction function, unlike the papers above where agents have imperfect information
about speciﬁc variables that appear in the reaction function.
More recently, a literature has emerged focusing on the question of whether transparency
3Svensson (1999) further argues on the ground of this result that for inﬂation targeting central banks it is
generally desirable to publish detailed information on policy objectives, including forecasts. Such transparency
enhances the public’s understanding of the monetary policy process and raises the cost to a central bank from
deviating from its stated objectives.
5of central bank forecasts of exogenous state variables is desirable. In these models, the pub-
lic correctly understands central bank preferences but has imperfect information about the
central bank’s forecast of the aggregate state. Building on Morris and Shin (2002), Amato
and Shin (2003), Hellwig (2002) and Walsh (2006), among others, show that full transparency
about the central bank forecast is not always desirable because private agents may overreact
to noisy public signals and under react to more accurate private information. More gener-
ally, Geraats (2002) argues that models based on diverse private information often have the
property that pronouncements by the central bank may lead to frequent shifts in expectations
leading to increased economic volatility. In contrast, Roca (2006) shows that some of these
conclusions depend on the postulated objectives of the central bank. Similarly, Svensson
(2006) and Woodford (2005) argue that the conclusions of Morris and Shin (2002) depend on
implausible parameter assumptions.4
Our analysis departs from this literature by analyzing the value of communicating infor-
mation about current and future nominal interest rate decisions of the central bank. Like
Walsh (2006), the present analysis considers a theory of price setting that is consistent with
recent New Keynesian analyses of monetary policy. Unlike Walsh, we propose a fully ar-
ticulated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, and, rather than assuming that the
central bank and private agents have asymmetric information about the kinds of disturbances
that aﬀect the economy, we consider a framework in which these actors have symmetric infor-
mation about shocks. The asymmetry instead lies in knowledge about how nominal interest
rates are determined – that is, monetary policy strategy. This permits a tractable analy-
sis of communication about endogenous decision variables of the central bank – that is the
sequence of choices about the path of nominal interest rates – rather than announcements
about exogenous state variables.5
Finally, the paper is related to Orphanides and Williams (2005) which presents a reduced
4See also Woodford (2005) and Geraats (2002) for a review of the beneﬁts of central bank communication
and transparency.
5Rudebusch and Williams (forthcoming) present an analysis that is similar in spirit, analyzing the con-
sequences of asymmetric information about future policy actions. One of the contributions of our paper is
to build on their analysis by developing microfoundations which imply asymmetric information about the
economy.
6form model in which announcing the inﬂation target achieves a better inﬂation-output trade-
oﬀ. Because it reduces the amplitude of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations the announcement of the
inﬂation target is welfare enhancing. However, in their model, regardless of whether or not
the inﬂation target is announced, expectations are well anchored: self-fulﬁlling expectations
cannot arise. The improvement in welfare results from agents having a more accurate forecast
of future policy decisions. In contrast, this paper presents a model in which self-fulﬁlling
expectations emerge even if the inﬂation target is announced and credible. However, consistent
with Orphanides and Williams (2005), we show that even when expectations are well anchored
i nt h ec a s eo fa n n o u n c i n ga ni n ﬂation target, variations in expectations lead to greater business
cycle ﬂuctuations in response to shocks than in the case where all details of the monetary
policy strategy are known to households and ﬁrms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 delineates a simple model of the macroeconomy.
Section 3 details private agents’ expectations formation and the adopted criterion to assess
macroeconomic stability. Section 4 provides foundational results. Section 5 explores the
role of communication in stabilization policy. Section 6 provides graphical analysis of the
dynamics of expectations under communication and provides some extensions to the core
analytical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
The following section details a simple model of output gap and inﬂation determination that
is similar in spirit to Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
Svensson and Woodford (2005). A continuum of households face a canonical consumption
allocation problem and decide how much to consume of available diﬀerentiated goods and
how much labor to supply to ﬁrms for the production of such goods. A continuum of mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods using labor as the only input
and face a price setting problem of the kind proposed by Rotemberg (1982).6 The major dif-
ference is the incorporation of non-rational beliefs. The analysis follows Marcet and Sargent
6An analysis of price setting of the kind proposed by Calvo (1983), as implemented by Yun (1996), would
lead to similar conclusions.
7(1989a) and Preston (2005), solving for optimal decisions conditional on current beliefs. We
abstract from various mechanisms of persistence, such as habit formation, price indexation
and inertial monetary policy. This provides sharp, perspicuous analytical results.7 However,
we demonstrate that our conclusions regarding the value of communication in policy design
remain pertinent in models with such frictions.
2.1 Microfoundations




























t denotes holdings of the one period riskless bond, Rt denotes the gross interest paid
on the bond, Wt the nominal wage, hi
t labor supplied by household i and Ti
t lump-sum taxes
and transfers for household i. Financial markets are assumed to be incomplete and Πt denotes
proﬁts from holding shares in an equal part of each ﬁrm. Nominal income in any period t is
PtY i
t = Wthi
t+PtΠt and Pt is the aggregate price level deﬁned below. ˆ Ei
t denote the beliefs at
time t held by each household i, which satisfy standard probability laws. Section 3 describes
the precise form of these beliefs and the information set available to agents in forming expec-
tations. However, two points are worth noting. First, in forming expectations, households
and ﬁrms observe only their own objectives, constraints and realizations of aggregate vari-
ables that are exogenous to their decision problems and beyond their control. They have no
knowledge of the beliefs, constraints and objectives of other agents in the economy: in conse-
quence agents are heterogeneous in their information sets in the sense that even though their
decision problems are identical, they do not know this to be true. Second, given the assumed
conditioning information for expectations formation, consumption plans are made one period
7It is also motivated by Milani (2004) which suggests that a purely forward looking model of this kind
with learning dynamics provides a superior characterization of U.S. macroeconomic time series than does a
rational expectations model with these persistence mechanisms.
8in advance and therefore predetermined.8 Labor supply decisions are not predetermined and
are conditioned on period t information.9













which is made of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, ci
t (j), each produced by a monopolis-
tically competitive ﬁrm j. The elasticity of substitution among diﬀerentiated goods, θt,i s
time-varying, with E [θt]=θ>1. This is a simple way of modeling time-varying mark-ups,
introducing a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output stabilization relevant to optimal policy
design.
A log-linear approximation to the ﬁrst order conditions of the household problem provides
the household Euler equation
ˆ C
i




t+1 − (ˆ ıt − πt+1)
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and ¯ z denotes the steady state value of any variable z.
Solving the Euler equation recursively backwards, taking expectations at time t − 1 and
substituting into the intertemporal budget constraint gives
ˆ C
i
t =( 1− β)ω
i






(1 − β)ˆ Y
i
T − β(iT − πT+1)
i
. (3)
8We consider a model with pricing and spending decisions determined one period in advance so as to put
households, ﬁrms and policymakers on an identical informational footing. This could similarly be achieved by
the alternative assumption that the central bank has a policy reaction function that responds to one period
ahead expectations of inﬂation and agents condition decisions on period t information. All results continue
to hold.
9This assumption ensures markets clear in equilibrium.
9Optimal consumption decisions depend on current wealth and on the expected future path of
income and the real interest rate.10 The optimal allocation rule is analogous to permanent
income theory, with diﬀerences emerging from allowing variations in the real rate of interest,
which can occur either due to variations in the nominal interest rate or inﬂation. Importantly,
nominal interest rates aﬀect consumption demand only through expectations of their future
evolution. This property underscores the role of managing expectations in policy design. Note
also, that as households become more patient, current consumption demand is more sensitive
to expectations about future macroeconomic conditions.
Firms. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Each diﬀerentiated
consumption good is produced according to the linear production function
Yj,t = Athj,t
where At denotes an aggregate technology shock. Each ﬁrm chooses a price Pjt in order to






















denotes period proﬁts and the quadratic term the cost of adjusting prices as in Rotemberg
(1982).11 The tax, τ, on revenues is chosen to eliminate the steady state distortion arising
from monopolistic competition. Given the incomplete markets assumption it is assumed that





10Using the fact that total household income is the sum of dividend and wage income, combined with the
ﬁrst order conditions for labor supply and consumption, delivers a decision rule for consumption that depends
only on forecasts of prices: that is, goods prices, nominal interest rates, wages and dividends. However, we
make the simplifying assumption that households forecast total income, the sum of dividend payments and
wages received.
11The results are similar to the case of a Calvo pricing model.
10for T ≥ t.12
















is the associated price index. Summing up, the ﬁrm chooses a sequence for Pj,t to maximize
proﬁts, given the constraint that demand should be satisﬁed at the posted price, taking as
given Pt, Yt, and Wt. Again, given the information upon which expectations are conditioned,
prices are determined one period in advance.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms set the same price, so that Pj,t = Pt. Log-linearizing
the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal price we obtain
ˆ Pt − ˆ Pt−1 = πt = ˆ E
i
t−1βπt+1 + ξ ˆ E
i
t−1 (ˆ st +ˆ µt)
where, ˆ Pt =l o g Pt, ξ = θ¯ Y/ ψ is inversely related to the cost of adjusting the prices, µt =
θt (θt − 1)
−1 denotes the mark-up; ˆ st ≡ ln(st/¯ s) marginal costs deﬁned below; and ˆ µt ≡
ln(µt/¯ µ). Solving forward and making use of the transversality condition we obtain






T−t ξ (ˆ sT +ˆ µT) (4)
which states that each ﬁrm’s current price depends on the expected future path of real mar-
ginal costs and cost-push shocks.







where the second equality comes from the household’s labor supply decision. Log-linearizing
we obtain
ˆ st = ˆ Ct − ˆ at,
12The precise details of this assumption are not impor t a n tt ot h ee n s u i n ga n a l y s i ss ol o n ga si nt h el o g
linear approximation future proﬁts are discounted at the rate β
T−t.
11so that current prices depend on expected future demand and technology. The responsiveness
of current prices to changes in expected demand depends on the degree of nominal rigidity. A
low degree of nominal rigidity implies a high value of ξ (corresponding to a low value of the
cost ψ): in this case ﬁrms respond aggressively to changes in perceived demand because price
changes are less costly. The opposite occurs in the case of higher costs of price adjustment.
The degree of price rigidity plays a key role in the stability analysis.
2.2 Market clearing, eﬃcient output and aggregate dynamics
The model is closed with assumptions on monetary and ﬁscal policy. The ﬁscal authority is
assumed to follow a zero debt policy in every period t and this is understood to be true by
agents.13 Monetary policy is discussed in detail in the subsequent section. For now it suﬃces
to note that a nominal interest rate rule is implemented. For a more general treatment of the
interactions of ﬁscal and monetary policy under learning dynamics see Eusepi and Preston
(2007) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006).







Ctdj = Ct. (5)
This condition states that output net of adjustment costs is equal to aggregate consumption,
determining the equilibrium demand for labor ht at the wage wt = Ct. This relation satisﬁes
the log-linear approximation
ˆ ht +ˆ at = ˆ Ct = ˆ Yt.
For later purpose it is useful to characterize the eﬃcient level of output – the level of output
that would occur absent nominal rigidities and distortionary shocks under rational expecta-
tions. Under these assumptions, optimal price setting implies the log-linear approximation
Et−1ˆ Y e
t = Et−1ˆ at. Hence predictable movements in the eﬃcient rate of output are entirely de-
termined by the aggregate technology shock. We can use the deﬁnition of eﬃcient output to
characterize the aggregate dynamics of the economy in terms of deviations from the eﬃcient
13This implies agents do not need to forecast future tax obligations as in the analysis of Eusepi and Preston
(2007).






Aggregating ﬁrm and household decisions, using (3) and (4), provides

















tdi = ˆ Et gives average expectations; xt = ˆ Yt − Et−1ˆ Y e
t denotes the log-deviation








rate of interest. The average expectations operator does not satisfy the law of iterated expec-
tations due to the assumption of completely imperfect common knowledge on the part of all
households and ﬁrms. Because agents do not know the beliefs, objectives and constraints of
others in the economy, they cannot infer aggregate probability laws. This is the property of
the irreducibility of long horizon forecasts noted by Preston (2005).
2.3 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority minimizes a standard quadratic loss function under the assumption
that agents have rational expectations. This approach follows a now substantial literature
on learning dynamics and monetary policy – see Howitt (1992) for the seminal contribution
and Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and Preston (2004, 2006), inter
alia, for subsequent contributions – motivated by the question of robustness of standard
policy advice to small deviations from the rational expectations assumption. For alternative
treatments of policy design that take into account private agent learning see Gaspar, Smets,
and Vestin (2005), Molnar and Santoro (2005) and Preston (2004, 2006).











13subject to the constraints
xt = Et−1xt+1 − Et−1 (it − πt+1 − r
e
t) (8)
πt = ξxt + βEt−1πt+1 + Et−1ˆ µt (9)
which are the model implied aggregate demand and supply equations under rational expec-
tations.14 Consequently Et denotes the rational expectations operator. The weight λx > 0
determines the relative priority given to output gap stabilization. A second order accurate
approximation to household welfare in this model can be shown to imply a speciﬁcv a l u ef o r
λx. Because this is not central to our conclusions, and because this more general notation per-
mits indexing a broader class of policy rules, we adopt this objective function unless otherwise
noted.





H e n c eo p t i m a lp o l i c yd i c t a t e si n t e r e s tr a t e st ob ea d j u s t e ds ot h a tp r e d i c t a b l em o v e m e n t si n
inﬂation are negatively related to those in the output gap.15 This targeting rule combined with










Without loss of generality, and to make the analysis as simple and transparent as possible,








ˆ µt = ρµˆ µt−1 + ε
µ
t
where 0 <ρ r,ρ µ < 1 and (εr
t,ε
µ
t ) are independently and identically distributed random
variables, with autoregressive coeﬃcients known to households and ﬁrms.16 Under these
14These expressions follow directly from (6) and (7) on noting that ˆ Et satisﬁes the law of iterated expecta-
tions under the assumption of rational expectations – households and ﬁrms know the objectives, beliefs and
constraints of other agents and can therefore determine aggregate probability laws in equilibrium.
15Policies under optimal commitment could similarly be analyzed without substantial diﬀerences in the
conclusions of this paper. However, because such policies introduce history dependence, analytical conditions
are somewhat tedious and we therefore take the case of discretion for convenience.
16This assumption can be dispensed with without altering results. Because these shocks are exogenous and
assumed to be observed by agents, it is immediate that estimating a ﬁrst order process for each shock will







ρµλx +( 1− ρµ)ξ
ξ
2 + λx(1 − βρµ)
ρµˆ µt−1
delineates the desired state contingent evolution of nominal interest rates required to imple-
ment the optimal equilibrium.
Following Svensson and Woodford (2005), rather than adopting the targeting rule (10)
directly as the policy rule, we instead assume the central bank implements policy according











where φ>0. The serves to limit the information that the central bank requires to implement
monetary policy. The central bank is assumed to observe private forecasts – through survey
data – or to have an identical internal forecasting model. This rule has the property that
if beliefs converge to the underlying rational expectations equilibrium then it is consistent
with implementing optimal policy under a rational expectations equilibrium. This follows





which in turn implies it = i∗
t as required for optimality under rational expectations. Note
also that it nests an expectations based Taylor rule as a special case, albeit with a stochastic
constant.17
3 Learning and Central bank Communication
This section describes agents’ learning behavior and the criterion to assess convergence of
b e l i e f s .A g e n t sd on o tk n o wt h et r u es t r u c t u r eo ft h ee c o n o m i cm o d e ld e t e r m i n i n ga g g r e g a t e
variables. To forecast state variables relevant to their decision problems, though beyond their
control, agents make use of atheoretical regression models. The regression model is assumed
to contain the set of variables that appear in the minimum state variable rational expectations
17The stochastic constant is largely irrelevant to the stability analysis under learning dynamics. Also, if the
assumption of discretionary optimization is unappealing, then a rule of this form with appropriately deﬁned
stochastic constant can implement the optimal equilibrium under commitment – see Preston (2006).
15solution to the model. Each period, as additional data become available, agents re-estimate
the coeﬃcients of their parametric model.
An immediate implication is that model dynamics are self-referential: the evolution of
ﬁrm and household beliefs inﬂuence the realizations of observed macroeconomic variables.
In turn, changes in observed data aﬀect agents’ beliefs formation. Learning induces time
variation in the data generating process describing inﬂation, output and nominal interest
rates. The central technical question concerns the conditions under which beliefs converge
to those that would obtain in the model under rational expectations, in which case the data
generating process characterizing the evolution of macroeconomic variables is time invariant.
Convergence is assessed using the notion of expectational stability outlined in Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).
A more fundamental implication of this self-referential property is that it permits analyzing
the role of communication in stabilizing expectations. In a rational expectations analysis,
expectations are pinned down by construction of the equilibrium and are necessarily consistent
with the adopted policy rule. By analyzing a model that permits beliefs to become unanchored
from rational expectations, the value of certain types of information regarding the monetary
policy process in stabilizing expectations can be clearly and fruitfully evaluated.
3.1 Forecasting
This section outlines the beliefs of agents in our benchmark analysis in the case of no commu-
nication. As additional information is communicated to households and ﬁrms, the structure
of beliefs will change accordingly. These modiﬁcations will be noted as they arise, with an













        

= ω0,t−1 + ω1,t−1Zt−1 +¯ et (12)
16where ω0 denotes the constant, ω1 is deﬁned as
ω1 =

        

ωxx ωxπ ωxi ωxu ωxr
ωπx ωππ ωπi ωπu ωπu
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
and ¯ et represents an i.i.d. estimation error. Agents are assumed to know the autocorrela-
tion coeﬃcients of the shocks but estimate the other parameters (with time subscripts being
dropped for convenience). Hence they are attempting to learn the average value of observed
macroeconomic data and also a set of slope coeﬃcients describing the reduced form relation-
ship between these macroeconomic objects and fundamental disturbances to the economy.
This paper models communication as information about the dynamics of nominal interest
rates. As an example of communication, suppose the central bank credibly announces that
monetary policy will be conducted so that inﬂation, output and nominal interest rates will on
average be zero in deviations from steady state. The model implication is that agents know
this with certainty and impose this restriction on their regression model. Hence ω0,t−1 =0
and agents need only learn a subset of coeﬃcients relevant to the reduced form dynamics of
macroeconomic aggregates. This captures well the idea that communicating characteristics
of the monetary policy strategy is an attempt to manage the evolution of expectations.
At the end of period t − 1 agents form their forecast about the future evolution of the
macroeconomic variables given their current beliefs about reduced form dynamics. Given the
vector Zt−1, expectations T +1periods ahead are calculated as









for each T>t − 1,w h e r eI5 is a (5 × 5) identity matrix. To evaluate expectations in


































T−tZT+1 = F0 (ω0,t−1,ω1,t−1)+F1 (ω1,t−1)Zt−1,
where
F0 (ω0,t−1,ω1)=( I5 − ω1,t−1)
−1 £
(1 − β)
−1 I5 − ω
2





1,t−1 (I5 − βω1,t−1)
−1
are, respectively, a (5 × 1) vector and (5 × 5) matrix.
3.2 Expectational Stability
Substituting for the expectations in the equations for the output gap, inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate, permits writing aggregate dynamics of the economy as
Zt = Γ0 (ω0,t−1,ω1,t−1)+Γ1 (ω1,t−1)Zt−1 + Γ2¯ εt (13)




t. This expression captures the dependency of observed dynamics on agents’ beliefs about
the future evolution of the economy. Moreover, it implicitly deﬁnes the mapping between
agents’ beliefs and the actual coeﬃcients describing observed dynamics as
T (ω0,t−1,ω 1,t−1)=( Γ0 (ω0,t−1,ω1,t−1), Γ1 (ω1,t−1)).
A rational expectations equilibrium is a ﬁxed point of this mapping. For such rational ex-
pectations equilibria we are interested in asking under what conditions does an economy
with learning dynamics converge to each equilibrium. Using stochastic approximation meth-
ods, Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that conditions




= T (ω0,ω1) − (ω0,ω 1), (14)
where τ denotes notional time. The rational expectations equilibrium is said to be expec-
tationally stable, or E-Stable, when agents use recursive least squares if and only if this
diﬀerential equation is locally stable in the neighborhood of the rational expectations equi-
librium.18
4 Preliminary Foundations
This section provides the benchmark theoretical results of the paper. The model properties
under both rational expectations and learning dynamics without communication are stated.
The analysis of various communication strategies in the implementation of monetary policy
is then explored in Section 5.
4.1 Benchmark Properties
To ground the analysis, and provide a well known comparative benchmark, the stability
properties of the model under rational expectations can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Under rational expectations, the model given by equations (6), (7) and (11)
has a unique bounded solution if φ>1.
This is an example of the Taylor principle. If nominal interest rates are adjusted suﬃciently
to ensure appropriate variation in the real rate of interest, then expectations are well anchored.
This feature along with other robustness properties noted by Levin, Wieland, and Williams
(2003) and Batini and Haldane (1999), have lead to advocacy of forecast-based instrument
rules for the implementation of monetary policy. Indeed, such policy rules appear in a number
of central bank forecasting models – for instance, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of
England. Furthermore, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) adduce empirical evidence
18Standard results for ordinary diﬀerential equations imply that a ﬁxed point is locally asymptotically stable
if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix D[T (ω0,ω1) − (ω0,ω1)] have negative real parts (where D denotes
the diﬀerentiation operator and the Jacobian understood to be evaluated at the relevant rational expectations
equilibrium).
19for such interest rate reaction functions. Under learning dynamics the model has strikingly
diﬀerent predictions for the evolution of household and ﬁrm expectations.
Proposition 2 Consider the economy under learning dynamics where the central bank does
n o tc o m m u n i c a t et h ep o l i c yr u l ea n dφ>1.
1. The REE is unstable under learning provided






where ψ(β) > 0, limβ→1 ψ(β)=0and limβ→0 ψ(β)=∞.H e n c e :
2. If β → 1, then the REE is unstable under learning for every ξ and φ.
3. If β → 0, then the REE is stable under learning for every ξ and φ.
For many reasonable parameter values, the optimal policy under rational expectations
cannot be implemented with learning and no communication, rendering the economy prone to
self-fulﬁlling expectations. Indeed, standard parameterizations invariably take the household’s
d i s c o u n tr a t et ob en e a ru n i t y .I nt h el i m i tβ → 1, instability occurs for all parameter values,
underscoring the importance of stabilizing long-term expectations. Conversely, as β becomes
small, ψ(β) becomes unboundedly large, guaranteeing stability of the equilibrium. Intuitively,
as β increases current consumption plans become more sensitive to expectations, and a correct
prediction of the future path of the nominal interest rate, together with predictions about
t h eo u t p u tg a pa n di n ﬂation, becomes crucial for stability. Analogously, as the degree of
nominal rigidity declines, goods prices become more sensitive to expectations about future
marginal cost conditions. Indeed, as ξ →∞ ,t h eﬂexible price limit, instability obtains for
all parameter values.
To give further insight to this result, consider the evolution of household beliefs in response
to an inﬂation shock. To characterize beliefs, we study the associated ordinary diﬀerential
equation of the E-Stability mapping. Figure 1 plots the local dynamics of the agents’ estimates
of ωx,r, ωπ,r and ωi,r – the estimated slope coeﬃcients on the eﬃcient rate disturbance. Given
as u ﬃciently large sample of data, the evolution of these belief coeﬃcients are arbitrarily well
described by the linear ordinary diﬀerential equation


























and J∗ is Jacobian of T (ω0,ω1). This represents the ﬁrst order dynamics of the ODE (14)
whose eigenvalues determine E-Stability properties – see the appendix for further details.
The economy is assumed to be initially in the deterministic steady state (with no shocks
occurring in the simulation). We then perturb the beliefs of private agents, making the initial
estimate of the inﬂation coeﬃcient, ωπr, higher than its rational expectations value. This can
be interpreted as an increase in inﬂation expectations or equivalently an expectational error
on the part of agents. The model is calibrated with β =0 .99, θ =1 0 , ξ =0 .13,φ=2and
ρµ = ρr =0 .9.
The solid lines represent expectations of each macroeconomic aggregate, while the dotted
line gives the level of the nominal interest rate. The expectational shock engenders higher
output and inﬂation, and gives rise to higher expectations of both these variables. The central
bank’s policy response is initially small, strengthening with a delay because of imperfect
21information about the state of the economy. When an increase in the nominal interest rate
does occur, it fails to curb the increase in expected and actual inﬂation because aggregate
demand only depends on predictable changes in nominal interest rates, and it takes time for
expectations to adjust. Private agents fail to correctly anticipate the future policy stance so
that the initial increase in the policy instrument has limited eﬀect on aggregate activity (real
interest rates decline), in turn validating initial expectations of higher inﬂation. While not
plotted, expectations about inﬂation, output and nominal interest rates diverge from their
rational expectations values with time. Section 5 further explores the dynamics of belief
formation under various assumptions about the degree of communication.
Two additional points are worth noting. First, under reasonable parameterizations an
increase in φ renders the equilibrium less stable – for example if ξ>(1 − β) and λx < 1.
Moreover, a central bank that does not communicate has incentives to be less aggressive
to inﬂation and more to output. As an example, a policy rule with φ<1 and λx suﬃ-
ciently high will yield stability under learning. While this result may seem counterintuitive,
it is a product of consumption decisions being predetermined and agents having an incorrect
model of interest rates. Nominal interest rates only aﬀect demand through their predictable
movements. Changes in interest rates in period t cannot aﬀect the current level of aggregate
demand. By responding too aggressively, the central bank can lead to households forming
conditional forecasts of future nominal interest rates that promote instability.19 This ﬁnding
contrasts with Ferrero (2004) and Orphanides and Williams (2005) which argue that under
learning policy should be more aggressive in response to inﬂation. The diﬀerence in conclu-
sion stems from the central bank’s knowledge of the state of the economy and the ability to
manipulate current demand through appropriate choice of the contemporaneous interest rate.
In the present analysis, in absence of central bank communication the latter is not possible,
and because the central bank has imperfect information about the current state it may have
reason to be cautious.
Why is λx important for expectations stabilization? Recall that prices depend on the
expected sequence of output gaps into the indeﬁnite future. As output gap expectations
19This observation explains the diﬀerence from the stability results for a similar class of policies discussed
in Preston (2006).
22increase, prices move accordingly, aﬀecting future inﬂation expectations. Thus the expected
output gap becomes a better indicator of future inﬂation expectations. By responding to
expected output gap the central bank can ‘move ahead’ of inﬂation expectations, preventing
instability.
Second, and related, the observation that policies giving greater weight to output gap
stabilization are less likely to be prone to instability has relevance for recent debate on the
merits of simple policy rules. For example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) demonstrate
in a medium-scale model of the kind developed by Smets and Wouters (2002), that optimal
monetary policy can be well approximated by a simple nominal interest rate rule that responds
to contemporaneous observations of inﬂation. Moreover, policies that respond to the output
gap are undesirable, since over-estimating the optimal elasticity by even small amounts can
lead to a sharp deterioration in household welfare. What the above result demonstrates is
that, in a world characterized by small departures from rational expectations, the policymaker
may face a trade-oﬀ: strong responses to the output gap may reduce welfare, but they may
protect against even more deleterious consequences from self-fulﬁlling expectations.
4.2 Eliminating Policy Delays
This striking instability result naturally raises the question of how can expectations be man-
aged more eﬀectively in the pursuit of macroeconomic stabilization. The model has two key
information frictions. First, the central bank responds to information about the true state of
the economy with a delay. This is an implication of the forecast-based monetary policy rule.
Second, households and ﬁr m sh a v ea ni n c o m p l e t em o d e lo ft h em a c r o e c o n o m ya n dn e e dt o
learn about the reduced-form dynamics of aggregate prices. It follows that agents are faced
with statistical uncertainty about the true data generating process describing the evolution
of nominal interest rates. Resolving these informational frictions may mitigate expectations
driven instability.
In regards to the policymaker’s uncertainty, suppose the central bank has perfect infor-











23which is closer in spirit to the policy proposed by Taylor (1993). The following result obtains.
Proposition 3 Consider the economy under learning dynamics and φ>1.I f t h e c e n t r a l
bank implements monetary policy with the rule (15) without communication then expectational
stability obtains for all parameter values under maintained assumptions.
Hence timely information about the state of the economy is invaluable to expectations
stabilization. By responding to contemporaneous observations of the inﬂation rate and the
output gap the Taylor principle is restored. Having perfect information about the aggregate
state reduces the delay in the adjustment of monetary policy, allowing the central bank
to anticipate shifts in expectations. Responding to changes in inﬂa t i o ni nat i m e l yf a s h i o n
prevents large deviations from the rational expectations equilibrium. Comparing this result to
proposition 2 underscores that instability stems from the interaction between the two sources
of information frictions in the model. Given that central banks are unlikely in practice to have
complete information about the current state of the economy, it is worth considering other
approaches to eﬀective management of expectations. The remainder of the paper therefore
explores the role of communication.
5 The Value of Communication
Communication is modelled in a very direct and simple way. Under learning dynamics,
households and ﬁrms are uncertain about the true data generating process characterizing the
future path of nominal interest rates, the output gap and inﬂation. We can therefore ask
what kinds of information about the monetary policy strategy assist in reducing the forecast
uncertainty that emerges from having a misspeciﬁed model. Hence the developed framework
permits a direct analysis of the beneﬁts of communication in managing expectations.
Three communication strategies are considered. First, the central bank announces the
precise details of its monetary policy, including both the variables upon which interest rate
decisions are conditioned and all relevant policy coeﬃcients. Second, the central bank com-
municates only the variables upon which policy decisions are conditioned. Third, the central
bank communicates its inﬂation target. These strategies successively reduce the information
24made available to the public and provide insight as to what kinds of information are conducive
to macroeconomic stabilization.
5.1 Strategy 1
This communication strategy discloses all details of the monetary policy decision process. The
central bank announces the precise reaction function used to determine the nominal interest
rate path as a function of expectations. Agents know which variables appear in the policy
rule and all relevant coeﬃcients. Hence, agents need not forecast the path of nominal interest
rates independently – they need only forecast the set of variables upon which nominal interest
rates depend. An alternative, but equivalent strategy, is the central bank announces in every
policy cycle t its conditional forecast path for the nominal interest rate, {Et−1iT}T≥t.S u c h
a communication strategy might arguably characterize current practice by the Norges Bank
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand – see Norges Bank (2006). These forecasts can be
used directly by the private sector in making spending and pricing decisions. Since they are
by construction consistent with the adopted policy rule, if agents base decisions directly on
these announced forecasts, it must be equivalent to households and ﬁrms knowing the policy
rule and constructing the forecast path of nominal interest rates independently, subject to
the caveats now noted.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that the private sector and the
central bank share the same expectations about the future evolution of the economy. This
assumption is dispensable. Analyzing a model in which the central bank communicates its
reaction function but in which there is disagreement about the forecasts is feasible though
beyond the scope of this paper.20
Regardless of how this communication strategy is implemented, we assume that the central
bank is perfectly credible, in the sense that the public fully incorporates announced information
in their forecasts without veriﬁcation. Issues related to cheap talk, as analyzed by Stein (1989)
and Moscarini (2007) for example, are not considered. We assume the central bank is able
20See Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) for an analysis of a New Keynesian model in which only one period
ahead forecasts matter and conditions under which heterogeneous forecasts deliver the same stability results.
This paper, however, does not study a model which requires agents to forecast nominal interest rates.
25to fully communicate its reaction function without noise so the market fully understands its
policy goals and strategy, both in the current period and into the indeﬁnite future.
Imposing knowledge of the policy rule on households’ and ﬁrms’ forecasting models –
or knowledge of the central bank’s conditional forecast path {Et−1iT}T≥t –i se q u i v a l e n tt o
substituting this equilibrium restriction into the aggregate demand equation to give
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The remaining model equations are unchanged with the exception of beliefs. Since nominal
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.
Under these assumptions, uncertainty about the model concerns only the laws of motion
for inﬂation and output, which are aﬀected by other factors of the model beyond monetary
policy decisions. Hence perfect knowledge about the central bank’s policy framework does
not guarantee that market participants fully understand the true model of the economy, since
agents continue to face uncertainty about the objectives and constraints of other households
and ﬁrms in the economy. However, it does tighten the connection between the projected
paths for inﬂation and nominal interest rates. This property proves fundamental.






T=t or, equivalently, the policy rule (11) and φ>1. Then the REE is stable for
all parameter values under maintained assumptions.
Communication of the policy rule completely mitigates instability under learning dynamics
– even though the central bank and the private sector have incomplete information about the
state of the economy. Indeed, given proposition 3, it is clear that communication has value
precisely in circumstances where the central bank is uncertain about the current state. The
result shows how communicating the reaction function helps shape beliefs about future policy,
26making it possible for agents to anticipate future policy. As an example, suppose inﬂation
expectations increase. Under full communication, agents’ conditional forecasts of inﬂation and
nominal interest rates are coordinated according to (11). Agents therefore correctly anticipate
that higher inﬂation leads to a higher path for nominal interest rates – one that is suﬃcient
to raise the projected path of the real interest rate. As a result, output decreases, leading to a
decrease in inﬂation, which in turn mitigates the initial increase in expectations, leading the
economy back to equilibrium. In absence of communication, an agents’ conditional forecasts
for nominal interest rates and inﬂation give rise to projected falls in future real interest rates,
generating instability by validating the initial increase in inﬂation expectations. Section 5
discusses further intuition of how communication stabilizes expectations.
5.2 Strategy 2
Now suppose the central bank only announces the set of variables relevant to monetary policy
deliberations so that agents do not know the precise restriction that holds between nominal
interest rates, inﬂation and the output gap. Furthermore, suppose that while agents do not
know the policy coeﬃcients, they do know that nominal interest rates are set according to a
linear function of these variables. By limiting knowledge of private agents about the monetary
policy process relative to the benchmark full-information analysis several aspects of central
bank communication can be captured. First, uncertainty about parameters and forecasts
can be interpreted as a constraint on the communication ability of the central bank. This
reﬂects the fact that the policy decision is the outcome of a complex process, the details of
which are often too costly to communicate – see Mishkin (2004). Second, the central bank
might face credibility issues, leading the private sector to want to verify announced policies.
Third, complete announcement might not be the optimal choice for the central bank, given
the agent’s learning process.21
This partial information about the policy process can be incorporated by households and
ﬁrms in the following two-step forecasting model. First, using the history of available data,
21A discussion of the optimal policy under learning is left for further research.
27agents run a regression of nominal interest rates on expected inﬂation and the output gap
it = ψ0,t−1 + ψπ,t−1 ˆ Et−1πt + ψx,t−1 ˆ Et−1xt + et.
This yields estimates of the coeﬃcients of the policy rule.22 Notice that, as shown in the
appendix, we consider the more general case where the regression is estimated using a recursive
instrumental variable method, allowing for the possibility that private sector and central bank
forecasts are diﬀerent or that the central bank can communicate its expectations with noise.
As a second step, given these estimates, agents proceed in the same manner as strategy 1:
they forecast the future paths of the output gap and inﬂation rate and then use the estimated
policy rule to construct a set of nominal interest rate forecasts.
Proposition 5 If households and ﬁrms understand the variables upon which nominal interest
rate decisions are conditioned and φ>1, then the REE is stable under learning for all
parameter values under maintained assumptions.
Thus the central bank need not disclose all details of the monetary policy strategy. It is
suﬃcient that information be given regarding the endogenous variables relevant to the deter-
mination of policy and the functional form of the rule – but not its parameterization. Credible
public pronouncements of this kind, combined with a suﬃcient history of data, provide agents
with adequate information to verify the implemented rule. And despite the estimation un-
certainty attached to the policy coeﬃcients, local to the rational expectations equilibrium of
interest, expectations are nonetheless well anchored relative to the no communication case.23
Indeed, this communication strategy is equally useful in protecting against instability from
expectations formation as strategy 1 in which agents know the true policy coeﬃcients. Of
course, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics would diﬀer across these two strategies – the es-
timation uncertainty being relevant to the true data generating process of macroeconomic
22There is an important subtlety in specifying this regression. We assume that private agents include a ﬁxed
constant and do not explicitly allow for a stochastic constant as in (11). Hence the regression is misspeciﬁed,
though the misspeciﬁction vanishes as ρr,ρ µ → 0. This assumption avoids multicollinearity problems in the
case of convergent learning dynamics, given the presence of only two shocks. An alternative approach, that
yields that same results, is to add an additional shock to the model and allow for a stochastic.
23Formally, this means that agents cannot hold initial beliefs about the policy coﬃcients that are too
diﬀerent from the true values. Analyzing this possibility would require a global analysis of the model which
is well beyond the scope of this paper.
28variables – which in turn has welfare implications. Analyzing such implications is beyond
the scope of this paper.
5.3 Strategy 3
Over the past two decades numerous countries have adopted inﬂation targeting as a framework
for implementing monetary policy. A central part of this monetary policy strategy has been
the clear articulation of a numerical target for inﬂation. As a ﬁnal exercise, we consider a
communication strategy that conveys not only the desired average outcome for inﬂation –
that is the inﬂation target – but also the associated values for nominal interest rates and the
output gap. Given that our analysis is in deviations from steady state, these three values are
clearly zero. As discussed in section 3, given this knowledge agents no longer need to estimate
a constant in their regression model, leading to more accurate forecasts of the future path of
nominal interest rates.
Proposition 6 Assume the central bank communicates only the inﬂation target ¯ π =0and
the associated values for the output gap and nominal interest rates, ¯ x =¯ ı =0 .




and let ρ → 1. Then the REE is unstable under learning if (17)
holds;
2. Let β → 1. Then the REE is unstable under learning if
(φ +2 ρ) > 2
φλ
ξ




where ˜ ψ(ρ) > 0, ˜ ψ(1) = 0 and ˜ ψ(0) = ∞.
Economies subject to persistent shocks may be prone to expectations driven instability.
Indeed, the stability conditions for the no communication case obtain for cost-push or eﬃ-
cient rate disturbance processes having roots near unity. This result nicely demonstrates a
fundamental insight of rational expectations analysis: it is not enough to announce an inﬂa-
tion target – one must also announce how one will achieve this target.24 Only by providing
24Note that if only the inﬂation target was announced without declaring the associated values of the long-
run interest rate and output gap targets, then the stability properties can only be worse since agents must
learn a greater number of coeﬃcients.




















Figure 2: Announcing the inﬂation target is not enough
information regarding the systematic component of monetary policy can expectations be ef-
fectively managed when shocks are persistent. In contrast, as ρ → 0,s ot h a ts h o c k sh a v en o
serial correlation, there is similarly no persistence in macroeconomic aggregates. Information
about the systematic component is less important as the economy has no intrinsic dynamics,
making household and ﬁrm forecasting problems less complex. The result also underscores
another diﬀerence to a rational expectations analysis of the model: the precise details of how
exogenous disturbances are speciﬁed matters for expectational stability. This is not true for
determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium.
To further interpret this condition a graphicala n a l y s i si su s e f u l .T h em o d e li sc a l i b r a t e d
s before. Figure 2 plots three contours demarcating stability and instability regions, below
and above respectively, as functions of the parameters (ξ, λx). Each contour is indexed by
the maximum autoregressive coeﬃcient, denoted ρM, in the two disturbance processes. It is
immediate that as the maximum eigenvalue increases the set of parameter values for which
30expectations are stabilized considerably narrows. For a given degree of price stickiness, as
the persistence in exogenous disturbance rises a much stronger response to the output gap
is required. Similarly, for a given weight on output gap stabilization, only in economies
with less ﬂexible prices does learnability of rational expectations equilibrium obtain. Hence,
the degree of nominal rigidity in price setting has important implications for stabilization
policy under learning dynamics. Economies with greater rigidity tend to be conducive to
expectations stabilization – current prices are less sensitive to expectations about future
macroeconomic conditions. Because prices move little, inﬂation expectations display low
volatility, in turn promoting macroeconomic stability. This is not a property of the model
under rational expectations: expectations are well anchored so long as the Taylor principle is
satisﬁed, regardless of the degree of nominal friction.
6 The Dynamics of Expectations and Extensions
So far the analysis has focused on conditions under which expectations are anchored. The
following discussion demonstrates that even when expectations are anchored in the long run,
communicating complete details of the monetary policy strategy greatly assists short-run
stabilization policy. Hence communication matters not only for expectational stability but
macroeconomic stability more generally. We then demonstrate that our insights regarding
the value of communication remain pertinent in a more richly speciﬁed model that includes
a number of frictions.
6.1 The Eﬃcacy of Short-Run Stabilization Policy
Consider ﬁrst the strategy in which the central bank announces the inﬂation target ¯ π =0
and ¯ x =¯ ı =0 . Furthermore, suppose that exogenous disturbances have suﬃciently weak
serial correlation, so that monetary policy induces local stability under learning – the case
of nonconvergence in learning dynamics being clearly undesirable for macroeconomic stabi-
lization. Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of an increase in inﬂation expectations. The plots are
generated in the way described in section 4. The two panels are distinguished by plotting the
level of the nominal interest rate against inﬂation expectations in the ﬁrst and expectations
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Figure 3: Dynamics under communication of the inﬂation target
of the nominal interest rate and inﬂation expectations in the second. The interest rate jumps
with the rise in inﬂation expectations, but fails to have a strong initial impact on inﬂation
expectations because of the absence of communication: market participants fail to anticipate
correctly the future path of the policy instrument. The second panel demonstrates why: ag-
gregate demand depends only on expectations of future nominal interest rates and it takes
time for these expectations to rise.
Given the weak initial eﬀect on inﬂation, and therefore on inﬂation expectations, the cen-
tral bank keeps increasing the nominal interest rate until inﬂation expectations start declining.
As the response of inﬂation expectations is inertial, the central bank tends to overtighten.
Hence inﬂation expectations, and as a consequence inﬂation, keep decreasing until they be-
come negative, overshooting their rational expectations equilibrium values. With low interest
rates and low inﬂation expectations a new cycle starts. The central bank eases its policy
stance but expectations react with a delay, leading to excessively low nominal interest rates
a n dh i g hi n ﬂation expectations. Agents’ beliefs eventually converge though the speed of con-
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Figure 4: The Beneﬁts of Communication
vergence depends on the chosen parameters. For example, a more aggressive policy towards
inﬂation would magnify the oscillatory convergence back to the equilibrium. The central bank
tends to over react to changes in expected inﬂation, amplifying expansions and recessions.
Now consider an identical analysis under full communication where market participants
understand the policy rule and can correctly forecast the future path of the policy instrument.
In this case, the actual and expected nominal interest rate are identical. Figure 4 shows that
expected inﬂation and the expected interest rate rise and fall together until they converge
back to the equilibrium. There is no overshooting. This is explained by market partici-
pants correctly anticipating that the interest rate will be higher in the future in response to
higher inﬂation expectations. The anticipated positive response of the nominal interest rate
increases the expected real interest rate with a reduction in output that further reduces inﬂa-
tion expectations. Convergence in beliefs is monotonic – there are no oscillatory dynamics
in expectations. This underscores that managing expectations, even in the case of stability
under learning dynamics, has stabilization beneﬁts. This is one of the central contributions
33of Orphanides and Williams (2005), though in the context of a reduced form model of the
macroeconomy.
The central bank can bring about inﬂation stabilization without excessive volatility of
the policy instrument by fully articulating its monetary policy strategy. In the case of no
communication, the central bank is more likely to over-react to changing economic conditions
with the result of excessively volatile interest rates and potentially destabilizing eﬀects on
expectations.
6.2 Some Robustness Exercises
Two features of the modeling environment might give cause to question the generality of re-
sults. First, when implementing monetary policy, the central bank must estimate the current
state conditional on period t − 1 information. Moreover, because household consumption
decisions are predetermined, aggregate demand is insensitive to contemporaneous changes in
the nominal interest rate. Second, the model does not include various mechanisms of persis-
tence, such as habit formation, price indexation and inertial monetary policy. Such frictions
might lead to a more stable environment if agents’ expectations are conditioned on lagged
state variables. Indeed, Bullard and Mitra (2000) and Preston (2006) have demonstrated that
conditioning policy decisions on lagged nominal interest rates and the price level, respectively,
helps promote stability under learning dynamics. This section demonstrates that models with
both these features continue to exhibit instability of the kind discussed, and, therefore, that



















subject to the same constraints speciﬁed in section 2. Consumption and labor supply plans
are now both conditioned on period t information and consumption is subject to an external
habit HT = γCi
T−1, where 0 <γ<1. Similarly suppose that ﬁrms condition prices on current
information. Then similar calculations determine aggregate demand and supply as












T−tξ (˜ xT +ˆ µT)
where
˜ xt = xt − γxt−1.
Finally, let monetary policy be determined by a nominal interest rate rule of the form






ˆ Etπt+1 + ¯ λx ˆ Etxt+1
´i
for ¯ λx > 0 so that current interest rates depend on expectations about the future state of
the economy. The minimum state variable solution to this model under rational expectations
now includes nominal interest rates and the output gap as state variables. Agents’ beliefs
continue to be given by (12). This closes the generalized model.
The existence of additional state variables might be thought to lead to a more stable
economic environment under learning dynamics and obviate the need for communication as
a prominent feature of the monetary policy strategy. Because analytical results are diﬃcult,
we here resort to a calibration study of the model. We set β =0 .99 and φ =1 .5.T h e
habit parameter is γ =0 .95, which is on the high side with respect to the recent empirical
literature to emphasize the robustness of our results. Two experiments are conducted. In the
ﬁrst, ρi =0(no interest smoothing), and the combination of ¯ λx and ξ that guarantee local
stability is analyzed. As in the model of section 2, a high response to output gap is needed
to guarantee local stability under learning.25 The higher ξ,t h em o r eﬂexible prices, and
the higher the required response to the output gap. Nonetheless, instability arises for many
reasonable parameters values as in the model presented in section 2. In the second experiment
we introduce some degree of interest smoothing with ρi =0 .7. Perhaps surprisingly, interest
smoothing increases the set of parameters for which we obtain instability. A higher weight on
past interest rates implies a lower weight on the current response to expected inﬂation and
output gap, making the path of the policy instrument ﬂatter and weakening the response to
the output gap. These experiments are repeated with date t−1 expectations in the monetary
25We consider ξ ∈ [0.01,0.13] and ¯ λx ∈ [0.01,1]. To assist interpretation, the former interval would imply
Calvo frequency of price adjustments on the interval [0.7,0.9].F o rξ>0.13 (or a Calvo parameter below 0.7)
instability occurs for any ¯ λx in the interval.
35policy rule and similar results obtain. Hence, the economy continues to be prone to instability
under no communication when the economy is not purely forward looking, and, given the logic
of the analysis in earlier sections, communication strategies of the kind discussed, would be
expected to be equally eﬀective in mitigating instability.
As a ﬁnal remark, consider the case of ρ = γ = ω =0 . This delivers the purely forward
looking model of section 2, with all decisions and policy now conditioned on time t information.
Here analogous analytical conditions are feasible for all cases analyzed in the paper. The basic
insights are identical, though there are some minor diﬀerences in detail. For instance, the
Taylor principle is only suﬃcient for determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium as too
strong response to expected inﬂation can give rise to indeterminacy.
These exercises, by no means exhaustive, demonstrate that the basic insights of the paper
are general. They do not depend on either the precise timing of information — whether
expectations are conditioned on time t or t − 1 information – or on the model being purely
forward looking. The fact that both the central bank and private agents face informational
problems renders communication a valuable tool in stabilization policy. By coordinating
expectations the central bank can better achieve its objectives.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the analysis of the
role of communication in a central bank’s monetary policy strategy. Three communication
strategies are considered when the central bank attempts to implement optimal policy. First,
the central bank announces the exact details of its monetary policy decision process. This
includes both the variables appearing in its policy rule and the relevant policy coeﬃcients.
Second, the central bank discloses only the variables appearing in the policy rule. This lim-
its the information households and ﬁrms have relative to the full information case, possibly
reﬂecting imperfect credibility of central bank announcements. Third, the central bank an-
nounces only its desired inﬂation target and associated long-run values of the output gap and
nominal interest rates.
The central results are as follows. Under no communication the policy rule fails to sta-
36bilize macroeconomic dynamics, promoting expectations driven ﬂuctuations – self-fulﬁlling
expectations are possible. However, by announcing the details of the policy process stability
is restored. Communication permits households and ﬁrms to construct more accurate fore-
casts of future macroeconomic conditions, engendering greater stability in observed output,
inﬂation and nominal interest rates.
If instead the central bank only discloses the variables upon which interest rate decisions
are condition, stability still obtains for all parameter values. Even though this communication
strategy imparts less information about the policy process relative to the full communication
case, the resulting estimation uncertainty is small. Hence, agents once again can make more
accurate forecasts which is conducive to macroeconomic stabilization.
Finally, if the central bank only announces the desired inﬂation target, economies with
persistent shocks will frequently be prone to expectations driven ﬂuctuations. This makes
clear that it is not suﬃcient to announce desired objectives – one must also announce the
systematic component of policy which describes how these objective will be achieved.
37A Appendix
A.1 Propositions and Proofs
Proposition 2: Under no communication, the REE is unstable under learning if




where ψ(β) > 0,ψ(1) = 0.
Proof: The ODE (14) evaluated at the rational expectations equilibrium, can be decom-








0 contains a sub-matrix of the Jacobian, evaluated at the REE equilibrium. The










































In order to show the instability result, it is suﬃcient to evaluate the real parts of the






















































which is positive under the assumption φ>1.
Evaluating (24) provides
2 − 4β +2 β
2 + β
³




which is negative provided






2 − 4β +2 β
2¢
.
Proposition 3: Assume that the central bank has perfect information about inﬂation and
output gap. Then the REE is stable under learning for all parameter values, independently
of central bank communication.
Proof: The proof follows the logic of Proposition 2. The only condition aﬀected by the
change in policy rule is (24). For the evolution of the constant terms we get
(φλβ + ξ(1 − β))(−2φλβ(1 − β) − 2ξβ
2 − ξ











2 (φ − ρ) − 2ξ (2βρ− β − 1)(βρ− 1)
¢




It is straightforward to show that the coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables converge to
their values under rational expectations. These results are available on request.






T=t or, equivalently, the policy rule (11). Then the REE is stable if
φ>1.
Proof: The system has lower dimensionality, since agents do not have to forecast the
nominal interest rate equation. Given that they know the steady state of the system, stability
under learning is governed by the dynamics of agent’s estimates of the shocks’ coeﬃcients and
the lagged endogenous variables coeﬃcients (also in this case they evolve as three separate










= ˜ F (ρr) so that instability can be determined by analyzing ˜ F (ρ).T h et r a c eo f
˜ F (ρ) is negative
(β +
βφλ
ξ − 2βρ+1 )
(−1+βρ)
< 0
and the determinant can be expressed as
β
φλ
ξ (1 − βρ)+ξ(φ − ρ)+( 1− βρ)(1 − ρ)
(−1+βρ)2
so that it is positive provided φ>1.F i n a l l y˜ Jω∗
e −I6 can be shown to have stable eigenvalue
f o re v e r yp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
Proposition 5: If households and ﬁrms understand the variables on which nominal
interest rate decisions are conditioned on, then the REE is stable under learning if φ>1.










The evolution of ˆ φ is described by:































where we assume agents use a Recursive Instrumental Variable estimator, to encompass the
case of noise in the announced forecast:




























40so we can substitute for the correct coeﬃcients
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Taking limits we have
·













































is ﬁnite we get





ˆ φ → φ.
The stability conditions are then the same as for the case of full communication.
Proposition 6: Assume the central bank communicates only the inﬂation target π∗ =0
and the associated values for the output gap and nominal interest rates x∗ = i∗ =0 .
411. Deﬁne ρM =m a x( ρu,ρ r) and let ρM → 1. Then the REE is unstable under learning if
(17) holds;
2. Let β → 1. Then the REE is unstable under learning if
ξ (φ +2 ρ) > 2
φλ
ξ
(1 − ρ)+˜ ψ(ρ), (25)
where ˜ ψ(ρ) > 0, ˜ ψ(1) = 0.
Proof: In case the agents know the constant of the system (ω0 =0 ), stability is determined
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and that F is continuous in ρ.T h er e s tf o l l o w s
from Proposition 1.
2. Let β → 1. We proceed as in Proposition 1. The trace of F
¡
ρM¢































Finally, the last element is
˜ ψ(ρ)+2
φλ
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